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REBATES AND LOYALTY DISCOUNTS SCHEMES IN EU: TOWARDS A MORE ECONOMIC 
APPROACH 
 
Rebates, which consist in a lump sum discount to the customer at the end of a reference period, 
have been used for a long time in economic transactions.  The ubiquitous use of rebates by many 
undertakings, both dominant and non dominant ones, gives an idea about the economic rationality 
of this practice. From an economic point of view, all different types of rebates have a common 
feature: they can be considered as a kind of price discrimination and, in common with this practice, 
they can have both a pro-competitive and an anticompetitive rationale and impact on the market. 
 
Economics, in general, have a positive approach towards rebating practices: they can be an efficient 
way to make price competition; they can create efficiency gains for companies and increase welfare 
for consumers through lower prices and/or higher quantities.    
 
However, the rebate schemes applied by dominant companies can be a cause of concern because of 
the risk of horizontal market foreclosure. In addition where rebates are applied by dominant 
companies in the intermediate markets, this can lead to the lessening of inter-brand competition at 
the downstream retail level. However, “the potential for anticompetitive effects will depend upon 
the specific details of the programs and the market power of the firms involved.”1 
For this reason is important to implement an economic approach in order to not the pro-competitive 
effects and efficiency gain linked to the rebates schemes.  
This paper is aimed to assess the antitrust implication of rebates scheme on competition when they 
are applied by dominant firms, on the light of the approach designed by the Discussion Paper on the 
application of art 82(“Discussion paper”) and the main pronunciation of European courts, in order 
to evaluate how and if the economics of rebates are balanced whit the competition issue. In fact in 
Europe, according to Discussion paper and considering cases in EU countries, there is a tendency to 
consider rebates exclusionary only on the basis on their potential to exclude rivals, without 
considering the effective harm on competition that they produce. The paper is structured as follow:  
in the first section it analyzes the economics of rebates for the firms. In the second section it 
analyzes the antitrust implications that arise when the rebates are applied by a dominant firm. In the 
last section it analyzes the approach followed by court in some relevant cases in EU and the 
approach followed in US regarding the same issue. 
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IL MARGIN SQUEEZE IN EUROPA DOPO TELIASONERA E TELEFONICA 
The European Court of Justice Decisions in TeliaSonera and Telefonica cases represent a milestone 
in the interpretation of Margin squeeze cases in Europe and kind of breaking point from the 
approach followed in the US.   
In particular, those court decisions have unplugged the margin squeeze cases from the refusal to 
deal type abuses and made it a specific kind of autonomous abuse of dominance that can be 
sanctioned according to the art. 102 of the TUFE.  
As it was clear from the Telefonica and TeliaSonera cases the abuse of dominance is in the margin 
squeezing action undertaken by the in dominant operator independently from the fact that:  
 The wholesale service is an essential input according to the conditions specified in the 
Bronner case. In TeliaSonera case the upstream service was provided by the incumbent on 
voluntary basis. 
 The downstream service prices offered are predatory.  
The abovementioned decisions are further important taking into account the relation between the 
ex-post competition rules and the ex-ante sector specific regulation where the dominant operator is 
subjected to the wholesale access obligations and to the price regulation by the national sector 
regulator. 
In  Deutsche Telekom case it is clarified that the imposition of ex-ante sector  specific regulation 
does not exempt the dominant operator from the liabilities imposed according to the art. 102 of 
TUFE, where those obligations leave a margin of discretion to the dominant operator in the 
definition of the prices. 
Those decisions further increase the distance between the EU and the US approach  adopted in the 
margin squeeze cases: the US cases  linkLine and Trinko   has confined the margin squeeze  as a 
subcategory of the refusal to deal, and ratifying the following necessary conditions in order to 
demonstrate the abuse:   
 The imposition of a specific obligation to deal according to the art 2 of Sherman Act 
 The downstream service prices offered are predatory.  
 
If the dominant undertaking is subjected to an access obligation imposed by ex-ante regulator  the 
margin squeeze would become a  a matters of regulation  and therefore, the competitors should refer 
to the sector regulator to ask for a price revision in a way to ensure them to replicate the 
incumbent’s downstream offers.  
 
REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY 
 
Regulatory Impact Assessment(hereinafter, “RIA”) has gradually become a key economic tool used 
by governments to assure that regulations issued are effective and efficient, and are thus able to 
reach the objectives for which they have been issued at lowest possible cost. As observed by a 
number of international organizations and leading scholars, a careful and meaningful use of RIA 
makes it  possible to avoid useless administrative burdens for businesses and public administrations; 
and to undertake policies that  are capable of promoting economic growth, competitiveness and 
sustainable development
2
.  
According to the European Network for Better Regulation definition, Impact Assessment is: 
 A systematic, mandatory, and consistent assessment of aspects of social, economic, or 
environmental impacts such as benefits and/or costs; 
 affecting interests external to the government; 
 of proposed regulations and other kinds of legal and policy instruments; 
to  i) inform policy decisions before a regulation, legal instrument, or policy is adopted; or ii) assess 
external impacts of regulatory and administrative practices; or iii) assess the accuracy of an earlier 
assessment
3
. 
The efficiency-oriented approach makes RIA very interesting from a law and economics 
perspective: RIA represents a pragmatic application of the law and economics theory, according to 
which a better understanding of the impact of the legal rules and of what kind of legislation is 
eligible to be issued can derive only by the application of economic concepts to ex ante assessment 
of the impact of legal rules. However, so far law and economics and RIA have mostly remained two 
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worlds apart. In the past few years, some authors have observed that RIA is a “missed opportunity” 
for law and economics, and the two fields of study should be integrated further
4
. 
In the course of this work I analyze in-depth the way in which RIA has been applied by the policy-
makers, in order to understand if the tool was implemented without exceptions and  what kind of 
results the use of RIA was able to achieve. In particular, I try to explain if the RIA model was 
applied in order to reach an “evidence based” way to adopt decisions by policy-makers, assuring the 
issuing of regulations able to catch all the possible impacts on the market on one hand, and the 
choose of the normative tools able to lead to the highest net benefit for the society as whole. 
In order to reach this objectives, the works is divided in two main parts. The first part focuses on the 
development of the RIA around the world, from the US experience to the European model of 
“Integrated Impact Assessment”, which captures the economic , social and environmental impacts 
of proposed new policies
5
. In the course of this overview I show the different features of  the RIA 
models according to the different institutional contest in which they have emerged, in order to 
demonstrate how the same instrument was used to solve different kinds of institutional problem, 
other than the explicit objective to help the legislator to issue an efficient and effective regulation.  
In the second part of the work I provide an empirical analysis of three policy initiatives undertaken 
by the European Commission the telecommunications sector. This cases are related to regulation of  
roaming charges, the decision whether to institute an European Regulator for electronic 
communications and the recent Commission Recommendation on the regulation of Next Generation 
Access Networks 
With the empirical analysis of this three cases study I aim to understand whether  the Impact 
Assessment (IA) was really used by the Commission to reach the objective of a “Better regulation” 
able to promote the European economic growth. In particular, I will analyze if in this three cases the 
technical nature of RIA tool was preserved, and whether the IA exercise helped the regulator in 
taking in account the impacts of all possible regulatory options and their associated impact. 
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